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Abstract. We revisit recent works by Don, Fehr, Majenz and Schaffner and by Liu and
Zhandry on the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ-protocols in the quantum
random oracle model (QROM). Two natural questions that arise in this context are: (1)
whether the results extend to the Fiat-Shamir transformation of multi-round interactive
proofs, and (2) whether Don et al.’s O(q2) loss in security is optimal.
Firstly, we answer question (1) in the affirmative. As a byproduct of solving a technical
difficulty in proving this result, we slightly improve the result of Don et al., equipping it
with a cleaner bound and an even simpler proof. We apply our result to digital signature
schemes showing that it can be used to prove strong security for schemes like MQDSS in the
QROM. As another application we prove QROM-security of a non-interactive OR proof by
Liu, Wei and Wong.
As for question (2), we show via a Grover-search based attack that Don et al.’s quadratic
security loss for the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ-protocols is optimal up to a small
constant factor. This extends to our new multi-round result, proving it tight up to a factor
that depends on the number of rounds only, i.e. is constant for any constant-round interactive
proof.
1 Introduction
Reprogramming the quantum random oracle. We reconsider the recent work of Don, Fehr,
Majenz and Schaffner [DFMS19] on the quantum random oracle model (QROM). On a technical
level, they showed how to reprogram the QROM adaptively at one input. More precisely, for any
oracle quantum algorithm AH , making q calls to a random oracle H and outputting a pair (x, z)
so that some predicate V (x,H(x), z) is satisfied, they showed existence of a “simulator” S that
mimics the random oracle, extracts x from AH by measuring one of the oracle queries to H , and
then reprograms H(x) to a given value Θ so that z output by AH now satisfies V (x,Θ, z), except
with a multiplicative O(q2) loss in probability (plus a negligible additive loss). We emphasize that
the challenging aspect of this problem is that AH ’s queries to H may be in quantum superposition,
and thus measuring such a query disturbs the state and thus the behavior of AH . Still, Don et
al. managed to control this disturbance sufficiently. In independent work and using very different
techniques, Liu and Zhandry [LZ19] showed a similar kind of result, but with a O(q9) loss.
As an immediate application of this technique, it is then concluded that the Fiat-Shamir trans-
formation of a Σ-protocol is as secure (in the QROM) as the original Σ-protocol (in the standard
model), up to a O(q2) loss, i.e., any of the typically considered security notions is preserved under
the Fiat-Shamir transformation, even in the quantum setting. In combination with prior work on
simulating signature queries [Unr17, KLS18], security (in the QROM) of Fiat-Shamir signatures
that arise from ordinary Σ-protocols then follows as a corollary.
Given important examples of multi-round public-coin interactive proofs, used in, e.g., MQDSS
[CHR+16] and for Bulletproofs [BBB+18]1, a natural question that arises is whether these tech-
niques and results extend to the reprogrammability of the QROM at multiple inputs and the
security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (in the QROM) of multi-round public-coin interactive
proofs. Another question is whether the O(q2) loss (for the original Σ-protocols) is optimal, or
whether one might hope for a linear loss as in the classical case.
In this work, we provide answers to both these natural questions—and more.
1 The security of the original Bulletproofs protocol relies on the hardness of discrete-log; however, work
in progress considers post-quantum secure versions [Boo].
A technical hurdle for generalizing [DFMS19] to multi-round Fiat-Shamir. To start
with, we observe that the naive approach of applying the original result of [DFMS19] inductively
so as to reprogram multiple inputs one by one does not work. This is due to a subtle technical
issue that has to do with the precise statement of the original result. In more detail, the statement
involves an additive error term εx ≥ 0 that depends on the particular choice of the point x, which
is (adaptively) chosen to be the input on which the random oracle (RO) is reprogrammed. The
guarantee provided by [DFMS19] is that this error term stays negligible even when summed over
all x’s, i.e.,
∑
x εx = negl. The formulation of the result for individual x’s with control over
∑
x εx
is important for the later applications to the Fiat-Shamir transformation. However, when applying
the result twice in a row, with the goal being to reprogram the RO at two inputs x1, x2, then we
end up with two error terms εx1 and ε
x1
x2
(with the second one depending on x1), where the first
one stays negligible when summed over x1 and the second one stays negligible when summed over
x2 (for any x1); but it is unclear that the sum εx1,x2 := εx1 + ε
x1
x2
stays negligible when summed
over x1 and x2, which is what we would need to get the corresponding generalized statement.
Our results As a first contribution, we revise the original result from [DFMS19] of reprogram-
ming the QROM at one input by showing an improved version that has no additive error term,
but only the original multiplicative O(q2) loss. For typical direct cryptographic applications, this
improvement makes no big quantitative difference due to the error term being negligible, but: (1) it
makes the statement cleaner and easier to formulate, (2) somewhat surprisingly, the proof is simpler
than that of the original result in [DFMS19], and (3) most importantly, it removes the technical
hurdle to extend to multiple inputs. Indeed, we then get the desired multi-input reprogrammability
result by means of a not too difficult, though somewhat tedious, induction argument.
Building on our multi-input reprogrammability result above, our next goal then is to show the
security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (in the QROM) of multi-round public-coin interactive
proofs. In contrast to the original result in [DFMS19] for the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ-
protocols some additional work is needed here, to deal with the order of the messages extracted
from the Fiat-Shamir adversary. Thus, as a stepping stone, we consider and analyze a variant of
the above multi-input reprogrammability result, which enforces the right order of the extracted
messages. As a simple corollary of this, we then obtain the desired security of multi-round Fiat-
Shamir. Here, the multiplicative loss becomes O(q2n) for a (2n+ 1)-round public-coin interactive
proof with constant n.
In the context of digital signatures, the original motivation for the Fiat-Shamir transformation,
we extend previous results by Unruh [Unr17] and Don et al. [DFMS19] to show that Fiat-Shamir
signature schemes based on a multi-round, honest-verifier zero knowledge public-coin interactive
quantum proof of knowledge have standard signature security (existential unforgeability under
chosen message attacks, UF-CMA) in the QROM. Assuming the additional collision-resistance-
like property of computationally unique responses, they are even strongly unforgeable. We go on
to apply this result to the signature scheme MQDSS [CHR+16], a candidate in the ongoing NIST
standardization process for post-quantum cryptographic schemes [NIS], providing its first QROM
proof.
Another application of our multi-round Fiat-Shamir result would for instance be to Bullet-
proofs [BBB+18].
As a second application of our multi-input reprogrammability result, we show security (in the
QROM) of the non-interactive OR-proof introduced by Liu, Wei and Wong [LWW04], further an-
alyzed by Fischlin, Harasser and Janson [FHJ20]. While the well-known (interactive) OR-proof by
Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers [CDS94] is a Σ-protocol and thus the results from [DFMS19]
apply, the inherently non-interactive OR-proof by Liu et al. does not follow this blueprint of being
obtained as the Fiat-Shamir transformation of a Σ-protocol (though in some sense it is “close” to
being of this form). We show here how the 2-input version of our multi-input reprogrammability
result implies security of this OR-proof in the QROM.
Our last contribution is a lower bound that shows that the multiplicative O(q2) loss in the
security argument of the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ-protocols is tight (up to a factor 4).
Thus, the O(q2) loss is unavoidable in general. Furthermore, we extend this lower bound to the
Fiat-Shamir transformation of multi-round interactive proofs as considered in this work, and we
show that also here to obtained loss O(q2n) is in general optimal, up to a constant that depends
on n only.
2
Related work Before the recently obtained reduction [DFMS19, LZ19] was available, the Fiat-
Shamir tranform in the QROM was studied in a number of works [Unr17, DFG13, KLS18], where
weaker security properties were shown. In addition, Unruh developed an alternative transform
[Unr15] that provided QROM security at the expense of an increased proof size. The Unruh trans-
form was later generalized to apply to 5-round public coin interactive proof systems [CHR+18].
2 Notation
Up to some modifications, we follow closely the notation used in [DFMS19]. We consider a (purified)
oracle quantum algorithm A that makes q queries to an oracle, i.e., an unspecified function H :
X → Y with finite non-empty sets X ,Y. Formally, A is described by a sequence of unitaries
A1, . . . , Aq and an initial state |φ0〉.
2 For technical reasons that will become clear later, we actually
allow (some of) the Ai’s to be a projection followed by a unitary (or vice versa). One can think
of such a projection as a measurement performed by the algorithm, with the algorithm aborting
except in case of a particular measurement outcome.
For any concrete choice of H : X → Y, the algorithm A computes the state
|φHq 〉 := A
H |φ0〉 := AqO
H · · ·A1O
H |φ0〉 ,
where OH is the unitary defined by OH : |c〉|x〉|y〉 7→ |c〉|x〉|y ⊕ c·H(x)〉 for any triple c ∈ {0, 1},
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, with OH acting on appropriate registers. We emphasize that we allow controlled
queries to H . Per se, this gives the algorithm more power, and thus will make our result only
stronger, but it is easy to see that such controlled queries to the standard quantum oracle for
a function can always be simulated by means of ordinary queries, at the price of one additional
query.3 The final state AH |φ0〉 is considered to be a state over registers X = X1 . . .Xn, Z and E.
Following [DFMS19], we introduce the following notation. For 0 ≤ i, j ≤ q we set
AHi→j := AjO
H · · ·Ai+1O
H ,
where, by convention, AHi→j is set to 1 if j ≤ i. Furthermore, we let
|φHi 〉 :=
(
AH0→i
)
|φ0〉
be the state of A after the i-th step but right before the (i+ 1)-st query, which is consistent with
|φHq 〉 above.
For a given function H : X → Y and for fixed x ∈ X and Θ ∈ Y, we define the reprogrammed
function H∗Θx : X → Y that coincides with H on X \ {x} but maps x to Θ. With this notation
at hand, we can then write
(
AH∗Θxi→q
) (
AH0→i
)
|φ0〉 =
(
AH∗Θxi→q
)
|φHi 〉
for an execution of A where the oracle is reprogrammed at a given point x after the i-th query.
We stress that (AH∗Θxi→q )(A
H
0→i) can again be considered to be an oracle quantum algorithm B,
which depends on Θ ∈ Y, that makes q queries to (the unprogrammed) function H . Indeed, the
(controlled) queries to the reprogrammed oracle H ∗Θx can be simulated by means of controlled
queries toH (using one additional “work qubit”).4 Exploiting that, in addition to unitaries, we allow
projections as elementary operations, we can also understand (AH∗Θxi→q )X(A
H
0→i) to be an oracle
quantum algorithm again that makes oracle queries to H , where X is the projection X = |x〉〈x|,
acting on the corresponding query register to the oracle.
2 Alternatively, we may regard |φ0〉, as an additional input given to A.
3 Allowing controlled queries to the random oracle is also the more natural model compared to restricting
to plain access to the unitary. After all, the motivation for the QROM is that in the real world, an
attacker can implement the modeled hash function on their quantum computer, so they can definitely
implement the controlled version as well.
4 Here it is crucial that we allow controlled queries to H .
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More generally, for any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n without duplicate entries, i.e., xi 6= xj for i 6= j,
and for any Θ ∈ Yn, we define
H ∗Θx = H ∗Θ1x1 ∗ · · · ∗Θnxn : X → Y
x 7→
{
Θi if x = xi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
H(x) otherwise.
This will then allow us to consider (AH∗Θ1x1∗Θ2x2i2→q )X2(A
H∗Θ1x1
i1→i2
)X1(A
H
0→i1
) as an oracle quantum
algorithm with oracle queries to H , etc.
Eventually, we are interested in the probability that after the execution of the original algorithm
AH , and upon measuring register X in the computational basis to obtain x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n,
the state of register Z is of a certain form dependent on x and H(x) = (H(x1), . . . , H(xn)). Such
a requirement (for a fixed x) is captured by a projection
GH
x
= |x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,H(x) ,
where {Πx,Θ}x,Θ is a family of projections with x ∈ X
n and Θ ∈ Yn, and with the understanding
that |x〉〈x| acts on X and Πx,H(x) on register Z. We refer to such a family of projections as a
quantum predicate. We use GΘx as a short hand for G
H∗Θx
x , and we write G
H
x and G
Θ
x with x ∈ X
and Θ ∈ Y for the case n = 1.
For an arbitrary but fixed x◦ ∈ X
n, we are then interested in the probability
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x, H(x), z) : (x, z)← A
H
]
=
∥∥GH
x◦
|φHq 〉
∥∥2
2
.
where the left hand side is our notation for this probability, where we understand AH to be an
algorithm that outputs the measured x together with the quantum state z in register Z, and V
to be the quantum predicate specified by the projections Πx,Θ. Correspondingly, Pr
[
x = x◦ ∧
V (x,H(x), z) : (x, z)← AH
]
= ‖GHx◦ |φ
H
q 〉‖
2
2 for the n = 1 case.
3 An improved single-input reprogramming result
For the case n = 1, Don et al. [DFMS19] show the existence of a black-box simulator S such that
for any oracle quantum algorithm A as considered above with oracle access to a uniformly random
H , it holds that
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (x, z)← 〈S
A, Θ〉
]
≥
1
2(q+1)(2q+3)
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,H(x), z) : (x, z)← A
H
]
− εx◦ ,
(1)
for any x◦ ∈ X , where the εx◦ ’s are non-negative and their sum over x◦ ∈ X is bounded by
1/(2q|Y|), i.e., negligible whenever |Y| is superpolynomial. The notation (x, z)← 〈SA, Θ〉 is to be
understood in that in a first stage SA outputs x, and then on input Θ it outputs z. At the core,
Equation (1) follows from Lemma 1 of [DFMS19] which shows that
E
Θ,i,b
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)(AH∗Θxi+b→q)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
]
≥
EΘ
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)|φH∗Θxq 〉∥∥22
]
2(q + 1)(2q + 3)
−
∥∥X |φHq 〉∥∥22
2(q + 1)|Y|
,
(2)
and from which the construction of S can be extracted. The bound (1) on the “success probability”
of S then follows from the observation that S can simulate the calls to H and to H∗Θx by means of
a 2(q+1)-wise independent hash function, and that H and H∗Θx are indistinguishable for random
H and Θ.
In this section we show an improved variant of Equation (1), which avoids the additive error term
εx◦ . While having negligible quantitative effect in typcial situations, it makes the statement simpler.
In addition, as explained in the introduction, it circumvents a technical issue one encounters when
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trying to extend to the multi-input case. Furthermore, our improved version comes with a simpler
proof.5
The approach is to avoid the additive error term in Equation (2). We achieve this by slightly
tweaking the simulator S. From the technical perspective, while on the left hand side of Equation
(2) the expectation is over a random i ∈ {0, . . . , q}, selecting one of the q + 1 queries of A at
random (where the X register of the output state is considered to be a final query), and a random
b ∈ {0, 1}, our new version has syntactically the same left hand side, but with the expectation over
a random pair (i, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , q91}×{0, 1})∪{(q, 0)} instead. This allows us to absorb the additive
error term into the success probability of the simulator. Furthermore, it holds for any fixed choice
of Θ (and not only on average for a random choice).
Lemma 1 Let A be a q-query oracle quantum algorithm. Then, for any function H : X → Y, any
x ∈ X and Θ ∈ Y, and any projection Πx,Θ, it holds that
E
i,b
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)(AH∗Θxi+b→q)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
]
≥
∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)|φH∗Θxq 〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2
,
where the expectation is over uniform (i, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , q91} × {0, 1})∪ {(q, 0)}.
This new version of Equation (2) translates to a simulator S that works by running A, but with
the following modifications. First, one of the q + 1 queries of A (also counting the final output in
register X) is measured, and the measurement outcome x is output by (the first stage of) S. We
emphasize that the crucial difference to [DFMS19] is that each of the q actual queries is picked
with probability 22q+1 , while the final output is picked with probability
1
2q+1 . Then, very much as in
[DFMS19], this very query of A is answered either using the original H or using the reprogrammed
oracle H ∗Θx, with the choice being made at random6, while all the remaining queries of A are
answered using oracle H∗Θx. Finally, (the second stage of) S outputs whatever A outputs.
In line with Theorem 1 in [DFMS19], i.e. Equation (1) above, we obtain the following result
from Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 (Measure-and-reprogram, single input) Let X and Y be finite non-empty sets.
There exists a black-box two-stage quantum algorithm S with the following property. Let A be an
arbitrary oracle quantum algorithm that makes q queries to a uniformly random H : X → Y and
that outputs some x ∈ X and a (possibly quantum) output z. Then, the two-stage algorithm SA
outputs some x ∈ X in the first stage and, upon a random Θ ∈ Y as input to the second stage, a
(possibly quantum) output z, so that for any x◦ ∈ X and any (possibly quantum) predicate V :
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (x, z)← 〈S
A, Θ〉
]
≥
1
(2q + 1)2
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,H(x), z) : (x, z)← A
H
]
.
Furthermore, S runs in time polynomial in q, log |X | and log |Y|.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows closely the proof of Equation (1) in [DFMS19], but the streamlined
statement and simulator allow to cut some corners.
Proof (of Lemma 1). For any 0 ≤ i ≤ q, inserting a resolution of the identity and exploiting that(
AH∗Θxi+1→q
)(
AHi→i+1
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 =
(
AH∗Θxi→q
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 ,
we can write(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)
|φHi+1〉
=
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 +
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)
X |φHi 〉
=
(
AH∗Θxi→q+1
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 +
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)
X |φHi 〉
=
(
AH∗Θxi→q+1
)
|φHi 〉 −
(
AH∗Θxi→q+1
)
X |φHi 〉 +
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)
X |φHi 〉
5 We thank Dominique Unruh for the idea that it might be possible to avoid the additive error term,
and for proposing an argument for achieving that, which inspired us to find the simpler argument we
eventually used.
6 If it is the final output that is measured then there is nothing left to reprogram, so no choice has to be
made.
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Rearranging terms, applying GΘx = (|x〉〈x| ⊗ Πx,Θ) and using the triangle equality, we can thus
bound ∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi→q )|φHi 〉∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+1→q)|φHi+1〉∥∥2
+
∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi→q )X |φHi 〉∥∥2
+
∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+1→q)(AHi→i+1)X |φHi 〉∥∥2 .
Summing up the respective sides of the inequality over i = 0, . . . , q − 1, we get∥∥GΘx |φH∗Θxq 〉∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥GΘx |φHq 〉∥∥2 + ∑
0≤i<q
b∈{0,1}
∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥2 .
By squaring both sides, dividing by 2q + 1 (i.e., the number of terms on the right hand side), and
using Jensen’s inequality on the right hand side, we obtain∥∥GΘx |φH∗Θxq 〉∥∥22
2q + 1
≤
∥∥GΘx |φHq 〉∥∥22 + ∑
0≤i<q
b∈{0,1}
∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
and thus, noting that we can write
∥∥GΘx |φHq 〉∥∥22 as∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q+1)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
with i = q and b = 0,∥∥GΘx |φH∗Θxq 〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2
≤ E
i,b
[∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
]
.
⊓⊔
For completeness, let us spell out how Theorem 8 of [DFMS19] on the generic security of the
Fiat-Shamir transformation (in the QROM) can now be re-phrased, avoiding the negligible error
term present in [DFMS19]. We refer to [DFMS19] or to our later Section 5 for the details on the
Fiat-Shamir transformation.
Theorem 3 There exists a black-box quantum polynomial-time two-stage quantum algorithm S
such that for any adaptive Fiat-Shamir adversary A, making q queries to a uniformly random
function H with appropriate domain and range, and for any x◦ ∈ X :
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈S
A,V〉
]
≥
1
(2q + 1)2
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V
H
FS(x, π) : (x, π)← A
H
]
.
4 Multi-input reprogrammability
In this section, we extend our (improved) results on adaptively reprogramming the quantum ran-
dom oracle at one point x ∈ X to multiple points x1, . . . , xn ∈ X . This in turn will allow us to
extend the results on the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation to multi-round protocols. We
point out again that the improvement of Lemma 1 over Lemma 1 in [DFMS19] plays a crucial
role here, in that it circumvents the trouble with the negligible error term that occurs when trying
to extend the result from [DFMS19] to the setting considered here.
The starting point is the following generalized version of the problem considered in Section 3.
We assume an oracle quantum algorithm AH that makes q queries to a random oracle H : X → Y
and then produces an output of the form (x1, . . . , xn, z), where z may be quantum, such that a
certain (quantum) predicate V (x1, H(x1), . . . , xn, H(xn), z) is satisfied with some probability. The
goal then is to turn such an AH into a multi-stage quantum algorithm S (the simulator) that,
stage by stage, outputs the xi’s and takes corresponding Θi’s as input, and eventually outputs
a (possibly quantum) z with the property that V (x1, Θ1, . . . , xn, Θn, z) is satisfied with similar
probability.
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4.1 The general case
Naively, one might hope for an S that outputs x1 in the first stage (obtained by measuring one of
the queries of AH), and then on input Θ1 proceeds by outputting x2 in the second stage (obtained
by measuring one of the subsequent queries of AH), etc. However, since AH may query the hashes
of x1, . . . , xn in an arbitrary order, we cannot hope for this to work. Therefore, we have to allow
S to produce x1, . . . , xn in an arbitrary order as well.
7 Formally, we consider S with the following
syntactic behavior: in the first stage it outputs a permutation π together with xpi(1) and takes
as input Θpi(1), and then for every subsequent stage 1 < i ≤ n it outputs xpi(i) and takes as
input Θpi(i); eventually, in the final stage (labeled by n + 1) it outputs z. In line with earlier
notation, but taking this additional complication into account, we denote such an execution of S
as (π, π(x), z)← 〈SA, π(Θ)〉.
A final issue is that if xi = xj then H(xi) = H(xj) as well, whereas Θi and Θj may well be
different. Thus, we can only expect S to work well when x1, . . . xn has no duplicates.
For us to be able to mathematically reason about the simulator described above, we introduce
some additional notation. For the basic simulator from Lemma 1 we write, using r1 = (b1, i1), as
SH,AΘ1,x1,r1 := S
H,A,Θ1,x1,r1 :=
(
AH∗Θ1x1i1+b1→q
)(
AHi1→i1+b1
)
X1
(
AH0→i1
)
.
This can be recursively extended by applying it to AH now being SH,AΘ1,x1,r1 so as to obtain
SH,AΘ1,2,x1,2,r1,2 :=
(
SH∗Θ2x2,A,Θ1,x1,r1i2+b2→q
)(
SH,A,Θ1,x1,r1i2→i2+b2
)
X2
(
SH,A,Θ1,x1,r10→i2
)
.
In general, we can consider the following operator, which simulates A and performs n measure-
ments:
SH,A
Θ,x,r :=
(
SH∗Θnxn,A,Θ,x,rin+bn→q
)(
SH,A,Θ,x,rin→in+bn
)
Xn
(
SH,A,Θ,x,r0→in
)
.
where, for arbitrary but fixed n and Θ = (Θ1, . . . , Θn) ∈ Y
n, the notation Θ is understood
as Θ = (Θ1, . . . , Θn−1) ∈ Y
n−1, and correspondingly for x etc. Finally, when considering fixed
Θ ∈ Yn and x ∈ Xn, we write
SHr (A) := S
H,A
Θ,x,r .
At the core of our multi-round result will be the following technical lemma, which generalizes
Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 Let A be a q-query oracle quantum algorithm. Then, for any function H : X → Y, any
x ∈ Xn and Θn ∈ Yn, and any projection Πx,Θ, it holds that∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)AH∗Θx|φ0〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2n
≤ E
r
[∥∥(|x〉〈x|A ⊗Πx,Θ)SHr (A)|φ0〉∥∥22
]
.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n, where the base case is given by Lemma 1.
For the induction step we first apply the base case, substituting xn for x1, Θn for Θ1, rn for
r1, H∗Θx for H , and Πˆxn,Θn for Πx1,Θ1 , where
Πˆxn,Θn = |x1〉〈x1| ⊗ . . .⊗ |xn91〉〈xn91| ⊗Πx,Θ
to obtain ∥∥(|xn〉〈xn| ⊗ Πˆxn,Θn)A(H∗Θx)∗Θnxn |φ0〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2
≤ E
rn
[∥∥(|xn〉〈xn|A ⊗ Πˆxn,Θn)SH∗Θxrn (A)|φ0〉∥∥22
]
which we can write as∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)AH∗Θx|φ0〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2n
≤
Ern
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)SH∗Θxrn (A)|φ0〉∥∥22
]
(2q + 1)2(n91)
(3)
7 Looking ahead, in Section 4.2 we will force AH to query, and thus S to extract, x1, . . . , xn in the right
order by requiring x2 to contain H(x1) as a substring, x3 to contain H(x2) as a substring, etc. This will
be important for the the multi-round Fiat-Shamir application.
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dividing both sides by (2q + 1)2(n91) and swapping registers appropriately (to make sure that the
register which contains xn comes after the others).
Now fix rn. We define
Πˆ
x,Θ := |xn〉〈xn| ⊗Πx,Θ.
and apply the induction hypothesis for n−1, substituting SH∗Θxrn (A) for A
H∗Θx, and Πˆ
x,Θ for
Π
x,Θ, in order to derive∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)SH∗Θxrn (A)|φ0〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2(n91)
=
∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗ Πˆ
x,Θ
)
SH∗Θxrn (A)|φ0〉
∥∥2
2
(2q + 1)2(n91)
≤ E
r
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗ Πˆ
x,Θ
)
SH
r
(Srn(A))|φ0〉
∥∥2
2
]
= E
r
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)SHr (A)|φ0〉∥∥22
]
.
Since this inequality holds for any fixed rn, it also holds in expectation over rn. Substituting it in
Equation 3, we retrieve the statement of the lemma. ⊓⊔
Remark 5 In case of x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n without duplicate entries, it follows from the resulting
mutual orthogonality of the projections Xj and the definition of S
H
r
(A) that the following holds.
The term in the expectation Er in the inequality of Lemma 4 vanishes for any r = (i,b) for
which there exist two distinct coordinates j 6= k with ij = ik. As such, we may well understand
this expectation to be over r = (i,b) for which ij 6= ik whenever j 6= k; this only increases the
expectation.8 In other words, we may assume that random distinct queries are measured in order
to extract x1, . . . , xn.
Theorem 6 (Measure-and-reprogram, multiple inputs) Let n be a positive integer, and let
X ,Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box polynomial-time (n+1)-stage quantum
algorithm S with the syntax as outlined at the start of this section, satisfying the following property.
Let A be an arbitrary oracle quantum algorithm that makes q queries to a uniformly random
H : X → Y and that outputs a tuple x ∈ Xn and a (possibly quantum) output z. Then, for any
x
◦ ∈ Xn without duplicate entries and for any predicate V :
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (π, π(x), z)← 〈SA, π(Θ)〉
]
≥
1
(q + 1)2n
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x, H(x), z) : (x, z)← AH
]
.
Proof. We consider the inequality of Lemma 4 with the expectation over r understood as in Re-
mark 5. Additionally taking the expectation over H and Θ on both sides, we obtain
E
H,Θ
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)AH∗Θx|φ0〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2n
]
≤ E
H,Θ,r
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)SHr (A)|φ0〉∥∥22
]
and note that this is equivalent to
E
H
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,H(x))AH |φ0〉∥∥22
(2q + 1)2n
]
≤ E
H,Θ,r
[∥∥(|x〉〈x| ⊗Πx,Θ)SHr (A)|φ0〉∥∥22
]
.
since all values Θj and H(xj) have the same distribution. The term S
H
r
(A)|φ0〉 = S
H,A
Θ,x,r|φ0〉
corresponds to the output of the simulator that uses oracle access to H to run A on an initial state
|φ0〉, while measuring queries ij (finding xj as the outcome) and reprogramming the oracle at xj
to Θj from the (ij + bj)-th query onwards, with (ij, bj) = rj .
Next, we note that the value of the right hand side does not change [Zha12] when instead
of giving S oracle access to H , we let it choose a random instance from a family of 2q-wise9
8 One might try to exploit this actual improvement in the bound; however, for typical choices of parame-
ters, with n a small constant and q large, this is insignificant.
9 It is easy to see that the result of [Zha12] also holds for controlled-query algorithms. Alternatively, the
q controlled queries can be simulated using q+1 plain queries, and a 2(q+1)-wise independent function
can be used.
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independent hash functions to simulate A on. The choice of r uniquely determines the permutation
π with the property ipi(1) < · · · < ipi(n); by definition of S
H,A
Θ,x,r, the values x = (x1, . . . , xn) are then
extracted from the adversary’s queries in the order π(x) = (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)). Since S chooses this
r itself, we can assume that it includes π in its output. Likewise, the simulator takes as input
to every stage— from the second to the (n+1)-st—a fresh random value, in the order given by
π(Θ). However, by definition of Πx,Θ the final output of the simulator satisfies the predicate V
with respect to the given order (without π), i.e. such that V (x,Θ, z) = 1, as is the claim of the
theorem. ⊓⊔
4.2 The time-ordered case
In some applications, like the multi-round version of the Fiat-Shamir transformation, we need
that the simulator extracts the messages in the right order. This can be achieved by replacing
the hash list H(x) =
(
H(x1), . . . , H(xn)
)
, consisting of individual hashes, by a hash chain, where
subsequent hashes depend on previous hashes. Intuitively, this enforces A to query the oracle in
the given order.
Formally, considering a function H : (X0 ∪ Y)×X → Y and given a tuple x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn)
in X0 ×X
n, we define the hash chain hH,x =
(
hH,x1 , . . . , h
H,x
n
)
given by
hH,x1 = H(x0, x1) and h
H,x
i := H
(
hH,xi−1 , xi
)
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Theorem 7 (Measure-and-reprogram, enforced extraction order) Let n be a positive in-
teger, and let X0,X and Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box polynomial-time
(n+1)-stage quantum algorithm S, satisfying the following property. Let A be an arbitrary oracle
quantum algorithm that makes q queries to a uniformly random H : (X0 ∪ Y) × X → Y and that
outputs a tuple x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (X0 ×X
n) and a (possibly quantum) output z. Then, for
any x◦ ∈ (X0 ×X
n) without duplicate entries and for any predicate V :
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (x, z)← 〈SA,Θ〉
]
≥
n!
(q + n+ 1)2n
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,hH,x, z) : (x, z)← AH
]
− ǫx◦ .
where ǫx◦ is equal to
n!
|Y| when summed over all x
◦.
Remark 8 The additive error term n!/|Y| stems from the fact that the extraction in the right
order fails if A succeeds in guessing one (or more) of the hashes in the hash chain. The claimed
term can be improved to (n−1)2/|Y|+n!/|Y|2 by doing a more fine-grained analysis, distinguishing
between permutations π 6= id that bring 2 elements “out of order” or more. In any case, it can be
made arbitrary small by extending the range Y of H for computing the hash chain.
Proof. First, we note that V (x,hH,x, z) = V ′(v, H(v), z) for v = (v1, . . . , vn) given by v1 = (x0, x1)
and vi =
(
hH,xi−1 , xi
)
=
(
H(vi−1), xi
)
for i ≥ 2, and V ′(v,h, z) :=
[
V (x,h, z) ∧ h′i= hi−1∀i ≥ 2
]
for any v of the form v1 = (x0, x1) and vi =
(
h′i, xi
)
for i ≥ 2. Next, at the cost of n additional
queries, we can extend A to an algorithm A+ that actually outputs (v, z), since A+ can easily
obtain the H(vi)’s by making n queries to H . These observations together give
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,hH,x, z) : (x, z)← AH
]
= Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v, H(v), z) : (v, z)← AH+
]
.
Let v◦ = (v◦1 , . . . , v
◦
n) with v
◦
i := (h
◦
i , x
◦
i ), where h
◦
1 = x
◦
0 and h
◦
i ∈ Y is arbitrary but fixed for
i ≥ 2. Let Θ be uniformly random in Yn. An application of Theorem 6 yields a simulator Sˆ with
Pr
Θ
[
v=v◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z) : (π, π(v), z) ← 〈SˆA+ , π(Θ)〉
]
≥
1
(q + n+ 1)2n
Pr
H
[
v=v◦ ∧ V ′(v, H(v), z) : (v, z)← AH+
]
.
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Summing both sides of the inequality over h◦i for i ≥ 2 yields
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z) : (π, π(v), z) ← 〈SˆA+ , π(Θ)〉
]
≥
1
(q + n+ 1)2n
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v, H(v), z) : (v, z)← AH+
]
=
1
(q + n+ 1)2n
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,hH,x, z) : (x, z)← AH
]
.
(4)
Recalling its construction, the simulator SˆA+ begins by sampling a uniformly random permutation
π, so we can write
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z) : (π, π(v), z) ← 〈SˆA+ , π(Θ)〉
]
=
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z) : (π, π(v), z)← 〈SˆA+ , π(Θ)〉
∣∣π = σ] . (5)
By definition, the predicate V ′(v,Θ, z) (with v of the form as explained above) is false whenever
there exists an i ≥ 2 such that hi 6= Θi−1. Now suppose that π 6= id, then there must be some j
such that π(j) < π(j − 1). This implies that the first π(j) stages of SˆA+ which together (in the
π(j)-th stage) produce vj = (hj , xj) are independent of Θj−1, since Θj−1 is given as input only
at the later stage π(j − 1). We thus have the following, taking it as understood, here and in the
sequel, that the random variables π,v,Θ and z are as in (5).
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z)
∣∣π 6= id] ≤ Pr[x=x◦ ∧ hj = Θj−1|π 6= id] = Pr
[
x=x◦|π 6= id
]
|Y|
.
Using Equation (5), we can bound
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z)
∣∣π=σ] ≤ 1
n!
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z)
∣∣π=id]+Pr
[
x=x◦|π 6=id
]
|Y|
.
We note that by definition of V ′,
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z)
∣∣π = id] ≥ Pr[x=x◦ ∧ V ′(v,Θ, z)∣∣π = id] .
Furthermore, we may define a new simulator S which takes oracle access to A and turns it into
A+, and always chooses π = id instead of a random permutation. Where Sˆ would output (v, z), S
ignores the h-part of v and simply outputs (x, z). We then have
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (x, z)← 〈SA,Θ〉
]
≥
n!
(q + n+ 1)2n
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,hH,x, z) : (x, z)← AH
]
− ǫx◦ .
with ǫx◦ given by ǫx◦ := n! · PrΘ
[
x = x◦|π 6= id
]
/|Y|. ⊓⊔
5 The multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation
A straightforward generalization of the Fiat-Shamir transformation can be applied to arbitrary
(i.e., multi-round) public-coin interactive proof systems (PCIP). We show here security of this
multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation in the QROM.
5.1 Public coin interactive proofs and multi-round Fiat-Shamir
We begin by defining PCIPs, mainly to fix notation, and the corresponding multi-round Fiat-
Shamir transformation.
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Definition 9 (Public coin interactive proof system (PCIP)) A (2n+1)-round public coin
interactive proof system (PCIP) Π = (P ,V) for a language L is a (2n+1)-round two-party inter-
active protocol of the form, with C being a finite non-empty set, and V a predicate:
Prover P(x) Verifier V(x)
a1−→
c1←− c1
$
← C
...
an−→
cn←− cn
$
← C
z
−→ Accept iff V (x, a1, c1, ..., an, cn, z) = 1
Remark 10 If the language L is definied by means of an (efficiently verifiable) witness relation
R ⊆ X ×W , then the prover typcially gets a witness w for x as an additional input. We then also
say that Π is a PCIP for the relation R. In case of a (2n+1)-round PCIP Π for a witness relation
R that is hard on average, meaning that there exists an instance generator Gen with the property
that for (w, x) ← Gen it holds that (w, x) ∈ R, but given x alone it is computationally hard to find
w with (w, x) ∈ R, Π is also called an identification scheme.
Just as in the ordinary Fiat-Shamir transformation, the interaction used to enforce the time
order between the prover committing to the message ai and receiving the challenge ci can be
replaced by means of a hash function. In addition, we can include the previous challenge (i.e. the
previous hash value) in the hash determining the next challenge to enforce the ordering of the n
pairs (ai, ci) according to increasing i. We thus obtain the following non-interactive proof system.
Definition 11 (Fiat-Shamir transformation for general PCIP (mFS))
Given an (2n+1)-round PCIP Π = (P ,V) for a language L and a hash function H with appropriate
domain, and range equal to C, we define the non-interactive proof system FS[Π] = (PHFS ,V
H
FS) as
follows. The prover P outputs
(x, a1, ..., an, z)← P
H
FS
where z and ai for i = 1, ..., n are computed using P, and the challenges are computed as
c1 = H(0, x, a1) and
ci = H(i− 1, ci−1, ai) for i = 2, ..., n ,
The verifier outputs ‘accept’ iff V (x, a1, c1, ..., an, cn, z) = 1 for c1 = H(0, x, a1) and ci = H(i −
1, ci−1, ai), i = 2, ..., n, denoted by VFS(x, a1, c1, ..., an, cn, z) = 1.
Remark 12 The challenge number i (minus 1) is included in the hash input to ensure that the
challenges are generated using distinct inputs to H with probability 1. This is to enable us to
apply Theorem 7, which only holds for duplicate-free lists of hash inputs. In fact, any additional
strings can be included in the argument when computing ci using H , without influencing the
security properties of the non-interactive proof system in a detrimental way. In the literature one
sometimes sees that the entire previous transcript is hashed (in which case the counter number i
may then be omitted).
5.2 General security of multi-round Fiat-Shamir in the QROM
When constructing a reduction for mFS, this reduction is participating as a prover in the underlying
PCIP, and is hence only provided with random challenges one at a time. We thus need the special
simulator from Theorem 7, which always outputs the corresponding messages in the right order.
The success of this simulator is based on the very essence of the Fiat-Shamir transformation,
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namely the fact that the intractability of the hash function takes the role of the interaction in
enforcing a time order in the transcript of the PCIP.
The security of the multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation follows as a simple Corollary of
Theorem 7.
Corollary 13 There exists a black-box quantum polynomial-time (n+1)-stage quantum algorithm S
such that for any adaptive adversary A against the multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformed version
FS[Π] of a (2n+1)-round PCIP Π, making q queries to a uniformly random function H with
appropriate domain and range equal C, and for any x◦ ∈ X :
Pr
[
x = x◦ ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈SA,V〉
]
≥
n!
(2q + n+ 1)2n
Pr
H
[
x = x◦ ∧ V HFS(x, π) : (x, π)← A
H
]
−ǫx◦ .
where the additive error term ǫx◦ is equal to
n!
|C| when summed over all x
◦.
Proof. We may simply set x◦ = (x◦, (0, a1), . . . , (n−1, an)) for arbitrary a1, . . . , an, apply Theorem
7 and then sum over all choices of a1, . . . , an to obtain the claimed inequality. Note that the round
indices ensure that every such x◦ is duplicate free, satisfying the corresponding requirement of
Theorem 7.
Note that the additive error terms reflect the fact that the random oracle only approximately
succeeds in enforcing the original time order in the transcript of the PCIP. However, it can be
made arbitrarily small, as discussed below.
Remark 14 There exist PCIPs with soundness error much smaller than 1/|C|. As an example,
consider the sequential repetition of a Σ-protocol with special soundness. Here, the soundness error
is 1/|C|n. In this case, the term proportional to 1/|C| renders the bound from the above theorem
trivial. Note however, that (i) this situation is extremely artificial, as there is absolutely no reason
to repeat sequentially instead of in parallel, and (ii) the additive error term can be made arbitrarily
small by considering a variant Π′ of Π where the random challenges are enlarged with a certain
number of bits that are ignored otherwise, see Remark 8.
In fact, we suspect that the observation from (i) is true in a much broader sense: if a PCIP
still has negligible soundness error when allowing the adversary to learn one of the challenges ci
in advance of sending the corresponding commitment-type message ai, it seems like the number of
rounds can be reduced and the loss in soundness error can be won back by parallel repetition.
As for the case of the Fiat-Shamir transformation for Σ-protocols, the general reduction implies
that security properties that protect against dishonest provers carry over from the interactive to
the non-interactive proof system. For a definition of the properties considered in the following
theorem, see, e.g. [DFMS19]. The quantum proof-of-knowledge-property was intoduced in [Unr12].
Corollary 15 (Preservation of Soundness/PoK) Let Π be a constant-round PCIP that has
(statistical/computational) soundness, and/or the (statistical/computational) quantum proof-of-
knowledge-property, respectively. Then, in the QROM, FS[Π] has (statistical/computational) sound-
ness, and/or the (statistical/computational) quantum proof-of-knowledge-property, too.
Proof. Corollary 13 turns any dishonest prover AFS[Π] for FS[Π] with success probability ǫ into a
dishonest prover AΠ for Π, with success probability ǫ · (2q + 1)
−2n, where 2n + 1 is the number
of rounds in Π. Since n is constant and q is polynomial in the security parameter, the success
probabilities of the respective provers are polynomially related. The claimed implications follow
now using the same arguments as in Corollaries 13 and 16 in [DFMS19]. ⊓⊔
6 Tightness of the reductions
Here, we show tightness of our results. We start with proving tightness of Theorems 2 and 3 (up
to essentially a factor 4). This implies that a O(q2)-loss is unavoidable in general. Indeed, the
following result shows that for a large and natural class of Σ-protocols Σ, there exists an attack
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against FS[Σ] that succeeds with a probability q2 times larger than the best attack against Σ. The
attack is based on an application of Grover’s quantum algorithm for unstructured search.
To our surprise, we could not find an analysis of Grover’s algorithm in the regime we require
in the literature. Grover search has been analyzed in the case of an unknown number of solutions
[BBHT98], but the focus of that work is on analyzing the expected number of queries required to
find a solution, while we analyze the probability with which the Grover search algorithm succeeds
for a fixed but arbitrary number of queries.
Theorem 16 Let L be a language, and let Σ be a Σ-protocol for L with challenge set C, spe-
cial soundness and perfect honest-verifier zero-knowledge. Furthermore, we assume that the triples
(a, c, z) produced by the simulator SZK(x) are always accepted by the verifier even for instances
x 6∈ L, and that a has min-entropy γ.10 Then for any q such that (q2 + 1) · e2 · (5q)6 < |C|
and 2γ/(5q)3 > 2, there exists a q-query dishonest prover that succeeds with probability q2/|C| in
producing a valid FS[Σ]-proof for an instance x 6∈ L.
The idea of the attack against FS[Σ] is quite simple. For a Σ-protocol that is special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge, meaning that the simulation works by first sampling the challenge c and the
repsonse z and then computing a fitting answer a as a function a(c, z), one simply does a Grover
search to find a pair (c, z) for which H
(
x, a(c, z)
)
= c. For a typical H , this will give a quadratic
improvement over the classical search, which, for a random H , succeeds with probability q/|C|
(due to the special soundness). A subtle issue is that, for some (unlikely) choices of H , there are
actually many (c, z) for which H
(
x, a(c, z)
)
= c, in which case the Grover search “overshoots”. In
the formal proof below, this is dealt with by controlling the probability of H having this (unlikely)
property. Also, it removes the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property by doing the Grover
search over the randomness of the simulator, which requires some additional caution.
Remark 17 It is not hard to see that Theorem 16 still holds in the following two variations
of the statement. (1) H(x, a) is random and independent for different choices of a, but is not
necessarily independent for different choices of x. (2) The Σ-protocol Σ is replaced by Σ′, which
has its challenge enlarged with a certain number of bits that are ignored otherwise, in line with
Remark 14, and FS[Σ′] then uses an H with a correspondingly enlarged range.11
Proof. Let SZK be the zero-knowledge simulator given by the perfect honest-verifier zero-knowledge
property of Σ. Consider an adversary AFS against FS[Σ], that works as follows for an arbitrary
instance x /∈ L:
– Define the function fH : R→ {0, 1} (where R is the set of random coins for SZK) as
fH(ρ) =
{
1 for SZK(x; ρ)→ (a, c, z) ∧H(x||a) = c
0 otherwise.
– Use Grover’s algorithm for q steps, to try and find ρ s.t. f(ρ) = 1
– Run SZK(x; ρ)→ (a, c, z) and output (x, a||z).
Let pH1 be the fraction of random coins from R that map to 1 under f
H . Note that by the special
soundness of Σ, in any accepting triple a determines c and we thus have EH [p
H
1 ] =
1
|C| . By the
way Grover works, after q iterations (requiring q queries to H) the probability pH2 of finding such
an input is sin2((2q + 1)ΘH), where 0 ≤ ΘH ≤ π/2 is such that sin2(ΘH) = pH1 . Now as long
as Θ is not too large to begin with (i.e. as long as the Grover search will not ‘overshoot’), pH2 is
approximately a factor q2 larger than pH1 . Our goal will be to show that also on average over H ,
10 These additional assumptions on the simulator could be avoided, but they simplify the proof. Further-
more, for typical Σ-protocols they are satisfied. In particular, the simulated transcripts for hard instances
are accepted by the verifier with high probability. Otherwise, the two polynomial-time algorithms could
otherwise be used to solve the hard instances, a contradiction.
11 While (1) follows by inspecting the proof, (2) holds more generically: the dishonest prover attacking
FS[Σ′] simply runs the prover attacking FS[Σ] but enlarges the output register of the hash queries, with
the corresponding state being set to be the fully mixed state in each query, and then dismisses these
additional qubits again.
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the improvement is at least q2. To this end we define Hbad := {H : p
H
1 > sin
2( pi6q+3 )} and Hgood
its complement. Then,
E
H
[pH2 ] = (1− α) · E
H
[
pH2 |H ∈ Hgood
]
+ α · E
H
[
pH2 |H ∈ Hbad
]
≥ (1− α) · E
H
[
pH2 |H ∈ Hgood
]
where α = PrH [H ∈ Hbad] and 1− α = PrH [H ∈ Hgood].
We first compute EHgood
[
pH2
]
. Let H ∈ Hgood. We have (2q + 1)Θ
H ≤ pi3 . Since
d
dΘ
sin(Θ) =
cos(Θ) ≥ 1/2 for Θ ∈ [0, pi3 ], and Θ ≥ sin(Θ), it follows that
sin((2q + 1) · ΘH) ≥ sin(ΘH) +
2q ·ΘH
2
≥ (q + 1) · sin(ΘH).
Using sin(Θ) ≥ 0 for Θ ∈ [0, pi3 ], we obtain
pH2 = sin
2((2q + 1) ·ΘH) ≥ (q + 1)2 · sin2(ΘH) = (q + 1)2 · pH1 .
Therefore,
E
H
[pH2 ] ≥ E
H
[
pH2 |H ∈ Hgood
]
· Pr
H
[H ∈ Hgood]
≥ (q + 1)2 · E
H
[
pH1 |H ∈ Hgood
]
· Pr
H
[H ∈ Hgood]
≥ (q + 1)2 ·
(
E
H
[pH1 ]− Pr
H
[H ∈ Hbad]
)
.
(6)
Next we bound α = PrH [H ∈ Hbad] = PrH [p
H
1 > sin
2( pi6q+3 )]. Note that for p
H
1 to be large, we
need that for many first messages a, H(a) must be the unique challenge c for which there exist
an accepting response. For a random H this is unlikely to happen. Formally, we argue as follows,
using the Chernoff bound eventually.
We first define the following equivalence relation:
ρ ∼ ρ′ iff SZK(ρ) = (a, c, z) ∧ SZK(ρ
′) = (a, c′, z′) for ρ, ρ′ ∈ R.
R/∼ then denotes the set of equivalence classes [ρ] = {ρ
′ ∈ R | ρ ∼ ρ′}. By the perfect special
soundness property and the assumptions on SZK, we have that a determines c (remember that
x /∈ L), and therefore fH is constant on elements within a given equivalence class. Thus, fH :
R/∼ → {0, 1}. For two distinct equivalence classes [ρ] 6= [ρ
′], we have
Pr
H
[fH([ρ]) = 1 ∧ fH([ρ′]) = 1] = Pr
H
[fH([ρ]) = 1] · Pr
H
[fH([ρ′]) = 1] ,
since H(x||a) is chosen independently for different a. Finally, taking XH :=
∑
[ρ] f
H([ρ]) we have
pH1 = Pr
ρ
[fH(ρ) = 1] =
∑
ρ f(ρ)
|R|
=
∑
[ρ]
(
fH([ρ]) · |[ρ]|
)
|R|
≤
|[ρmax]| ·
∑
[ρ] f
H([ρ])
|R|
= XH · 2−γ
where [ρmax] is the [ρ] that maximizes |[ρ]|. It follows that
α = Pr
H
[pH1 > sin
2
(
π
6q + 3
)
]
≤ Pr
H
[
XH > sin2
(
π
6q + 3
)
· 2γ
]
≤ Pr
H
[
XH >
2γ
|C|
+
2γ
(5q)3
]
where we used sin2(x) > x3 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.80 and pi6q+3 >
1
5q +
3
√
1
|C| for |C| > (5q)
3 in the last
inequality. By definition of f , for any [ρ] we have PrH [f(ρ) = 1] =
1
|C| , hence
E
H
[X ] =
∑
[ρ]
E
H
[fH([ρ])] =
∑
[ρ]
Pr
H
[fH([ρ]) = 1] =
|R/∼|
|C|
≥
2γ
|C|
.
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We use the following Chernoff bound:
Pr
H
[
XH > (1 + δ) · E
H
[
XH
]]
<
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)EH [XH ]
<
(
e1+δ
δ1+δ
)EH [XH ]
=
(e
δ
)EH [XH ]·(1+δ)
.
Setting δ := |C|(5q)3 , together with the inequalities derived above this leads to
α ≤
(
e · (5q)3
|C|
) 2γ
|C|
+ 2
γ
(5q)3
<
e2 · (5q)6
|C|2
<
1
|C| · (q2 + 1)
where we used 2
γ
(5q)3 > 2 in the second to last, and |C| > (q
2 + 1) · e2 · (5q)6 in the last inequality.
Plugging this bound into Equation 6, we get
E
H
[pH2 ] ≥ (q
2 + 1) ·
(
p1 −
1
|C| · (q2 + 1)
)
=
q2
|C|
+
1
|C|
−
1
|C|
=
q2
|C|
.
Thus, the success probability of our adversary AFS after making q queries to H is at least
q2
|C| . ⊓⊔
The tightness of Corollary 13 follows from the above tightness result for the case of Σ-protocols
in a fairly straightforward manner.
Theorem 18 For every positive integer n, there exists a (2n+1)-round PCIP Π with soundness
error ǫ and challenge space C such that |C| ≥ 1/ǫ and such that there exists a q-query dishonest
prover A on FS(Π) with success probability n−2nq2nǫ.
Before proving the theorem, we show how it implies the tightness of Theorem 13.
Corollary 19 The security loss in the bound in Corollary 13 is optimal, up to a multiplicative
factor that depends on n only.
Proof. Let Π be a PCIP as shown to exist in Theorem 18. Let ǫΠ , and ǫFS(Π)(q), be the soundness
error of Π, and the one of its Fiat Shamir transformation against q-query adversaries, respectively.
By Theorem 18,
ǫFS(Π)(q) ≥ n
−2nq2nǫΠ. (7)
Theorem 13, on the other hand, yields
ǫΠ ≥
n!
(2q + n+ 1)2n
ǫFS(Π)(q)−
n!
|C|
(8)
≥
n!
(2q + n+ 1)2n
ǫFS(Π)(q)− n!ǫΠ, (9)
where we used the condition on the challenge space size from Theorem 18 in the last line. Rear-
ranging terms we obtain
ǫFS(Π)(q) ≤ (2q + n+ 1)
2n
(
1 +
1
n!
)
ǫΠ(q) (10)
≤ 2(n+ 3)2q2nǫΠ(q), (11)
where we have used 1 ≤ q in the last line. In summary, we have constants c1 = n
−2n and c2 =
2(n+ 3)2n such that
c1q
2nǫΠ ≤ ǫFS(Π)(q) ≤ c2q
2nǫΠ. (12)
⊓⊔
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Proof (of Theorem 18). Let Σˆ be a Σ-protocol for a language L fulfilling the requirements of
Theorem 16. Let the challenge space be denoted by Cˆ. Given an arbitrary positive integer, we
define an (2n+1)-round PCIP Π for the same language L by means of n sequential independent
executions of Σˆ . Concretely, the 2n+1 messages of Π are given in terms of the messages aˆi, cˆi and
zˆi of the i-th repetition of Σˆ as
a1 = aˆ1
ci = (cˆi, ri) for i = 1, ..., n
ai = (aˆi, zˆi−1) for i = 2, ..., n, and
z = zˆn,
where ri is an independent random string of arbitrary (but fixed) length, which is ignored otherwise
(in line with Remark 14). The purpose of ri is to make the challenge space C of Π arbitrary large,
as required. The verification procedure of Π simply checks if all the triples (aˆi, cˆi, zˆi) are accepted
by Σˆ. By the special soundness property of Σˆ, the soundness error of this PCIP is ǫ = |Cˆ|−n.
Using Theorem 16, we can attack the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σˆ repeatedly to devise an
attack agains FS(Π): first use Theorem 16 to find aˆ1 and zˆ1, then use it again to find aˆ2 and zˆ2,
etc., having the property that with the correctly computed challenges these form valid triples for
an instance x 6∈ L. In each invocation of Theorem 16 we use a q′-query attack, which then succeeds
with probability q′2/|Cˆ|. Thus, using in total q = nq′ queries, we succeed in breaking FS[Π] with
probability q′2n/|Cˆ|n = n−2nq2nǫ, as claimed.
There are two issues we neglected in the above argument. First, we actually employ Theorem 16
for attacking a variant of Σˆ that has its challenge enlarged (and thus is not special sound); and,
second, the challenge ci is computed as
ci = H(i− 1, ..., H(1, H(0, x, aˆ1), aˆ2), ..., aˆi) ,
which is not a uniformly random function of x and aˆi (but only of aˆi). However, by Remark 17,
the attack from Theorem 16 still applies. ⊓⊔
7 Applications
7.1 Digital signature schemes from multi-round Fiat-Shamir
One of the prime applications of the Fiat-Shamir transformation is the construction of digital
signature schemes from interactive identification schemes. In this context, multi-round variants have
also been used. An example where a QROM reduction is especially desirable is MQDSS [CHR+16],
a candidate digital signature scheme in the ongoing NIST standardization process for post-quantum
cryptographic schemes [NIS]. This digital signature scheme is constructed by applying the multi-
round Fiat-Shamir transformation to the 5-round identification scheme by Sakumoto, Shirai, and
Hiwatari [SSH11] based on the hardness of solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations.
In this section, we present a generic construction of a digital signature scheme based on multi-
round FS, and give a proof sketch of its strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks. We
refrain from giving a full, self-contained proof here so as to not distract from our main technical
result and its implications. Many, though not all, parts of the argument are very similar to the
ones made elsewhere for the 3-round case.
The following construction is a straightforward generalization of the original construction of
Fiat and Shamir.
Definition 20 (Fiat-Shamir signatures from a general PCIP) Given an (2n+1)-round pub-
lic coin identification scheme Π = (Gen,P ,V) for a witness relation R and a hash function H
with appropriate domain and range equal to C, we define the digital signature scheme Sig[Π] =
(Gen, Sign,Verify) as follows. The key generation algorithm Gen is just the one from Π. The sign-
ing algorithm Sign, on input a secret key sk and a message m, outputs
σ = (a1, ..., an, z)← Signsk(m)
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where z and ai for i = 1, ..., n are computed using P(pk), and the challenges are computed as
c1 = H(0, pk,m, a1) and
ci = H(i− 1, ci−1, ai) for i = 2, ..., n .
The verification algorithm Verify, on input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ =
(a1, ..., an, z), computes ci as specified above, outputs ‘accept’ iff Vpk(a1, c1, ..., an, cn, z) = 1, de-
noted by Verifypk(m,σ) = 1.
We note that the above definition is equivalent to the following, alternative formulation: Let
Signsk(m) produce σ by running P
H
FS(x||m), and let Verify(m,σ) be equal to the outcome of
V HFS(x||m), where (P
H
FS , V
H
FS) = FS[Π
∗] and Π∗ = (P∗,V∗) is the identification scheme obtained
from Π by setting P∗(x||m) = P(x) and V∗(x||m) = V(x) for any m. This alternative formulation
will be convenient in the proof of Theorem 23.
Remark 21 As in the case of the plain multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation, one can include
arbitrary additional strings in the argument when computing the challenges ci. Examples where
this is done include the MQDSS signature scheme [CHR+16], where the message m and the first
commitment a1 are also included in the argument for computing the second challenge, and Bul-
letproofs, where the challenges are computed by hashing the entire transcript up to that point
[BBB+18].
As an identification scheme is an interactive honest-verifier zero knowledge proof of knowledge of
a secret key, the above signature scheme is a a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of knowledge
of a secret key according to Corollary 13. For a digital signature scheme, however, the stronger
security notion of (strong) unforgeability against chosen message ((s)UF-CMA) attacks is required.
In the following, we give a proof sketch for the fact that the above signature scheme is (s)UF-
CMA. This fact follows immediately once we have convinced ourselves that a certain result by
Unruh about the Fiat-Shamir transformation holds for the multi-round case as well: For the Fiat-
Shamir transformation of Σ-protocols, extractability implies a stronger notion of extractability
enabling a proof of (s)UF-CMA [Unr17]. Here, we just patch the parts of the proof from [Unr17]
that make use of the fact that the underlying PCIP has only three rounds.
For the following we need the notion of a PCIP having computationally unique responses.
Definition 22 (Computationally unique responses - PCIP) A (2n+1)-round PCIP Π =
(P ,V) is said to have computationally unique responses if given a partial transcript
(x, a1, c1, . . . ai, ci) it is computationally hard to find two accepting conversations that both extend
the partial transcript but differ in (at least) ai+1 (here we consider z to be equal to an+1), i.e. for
coni = x, a1, c1, . . . ai, ci, a
(j)
i+1, c
(j)
i+1 . . . , a
(j)
n , c
(j)
n , z(j), j = 1, 2 we have that
Pr [V(con1) = 1 ∧ V(con2) = 1 : (con1, con2)← A]
is negligible for computationally bounded (quantum) A, where a
(1)
i+1 6= a
(2)
i+1.
Equipped with this definition, we can state the main result of this section.
Theorem 23 ((s)UF-CMA of multi-round FS signatures) Let Π be a PCIP for some hard
relation R, which is a quantum proof of knowledge and satisfies completeness, HVZK, and has
unpredictable commitments12 as well as a superpolynomially large challenge space. Then Sig[Π] is
existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (UF-CMA). If Π in addition has computa-
tionally unique responses, Sig[Π] is strongly existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack
(sUF-CMA).
In [Unr17] (Theorem 24, and 25, respectively), it is proven that an extractable FS proof system
(of an HVZK Σ-protocol, and of an HVZK Σ-protocol with computationally unique responses,
respectively) satisfies the stronger notion of (strong) simulation-sound extractability. In addition, it
12 We take unpredictable commitments for PCIP’s to be exactly the same as for Σ-protocols, with the first
message playing the role of the commitment.
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is shown that such a FS proof system gives rise to a (s)UF-CMA signature scheme if the underlying
relation is hard. Corollary 15 implies that FS[Π∗] is indeed extractable if Π is extractable. Below we
rely on the proof in [Unr17] to argue simulation-sound extractability, only pointing out a particular
difference for the multi-round case.
Proof (sketch). Since Π is a quantum proof of knowledge, so is Π∗. By Corollary 15, FS[Π∗] is a
quantum proof of knowledge (extractable), and by Theorem 20 in [Unr17] (which easily generalizes
to the multi-round setting), completeness, unpredictable commitments13 and HVZK of Π∗ together
imply ZK for FS[Π∗]. For the proof that FS[Π∗] is also simulation-sound extractable, we refer to
the proof of Theorem 24 in [Unr17], noting only that in the hop from Game 1 to Game 2 we
have to adjust the argument as follows: Let SZK be the zero-knowledge simulator that runs the
HVZK simulator from Π∗ and reprograms the oracle as necessary. We write Hf for the oracle
H after it has been reprogrammed by SZK , at the end of the run of A. We have to show that
V
Hf
FS (x, a1, . . . , an, z) = 1 implies V
H
FS(x, a1, . . . , an, z) = 1, where (x, a1, . . . , an, z) is the final
output of A. Suppose the implication does not hold. Then either (i) Hf (0, x, a1) 6= H(0, x, a1)
or (ii) Hf (i − 1, ci−1, ai) 6= H(i − 1, c
′
i−1, ai) for some i, where ci−1 is the (i−1)-st challenge as
recomputed by V
Hf
FS and c
′
i−1 is the one computed by V
H
FS . In case (i) holds, A has queried x and
the corresponding forged proof that was output by SZK starts with a1. In case (ii), assume that
Hf (j − 1, cj−1, aj) = H(j − 1, cj−1, aj) for all j < i, so that ci−1 = c
′
i−1. Then,
Hf (i − 1, ..., H(1, H(0, x, a1), a2), ..., ai) 6= H(i− 1, ..., H(1, H(0, x, a1), a2), ..., ai)
which means that A either queried x and the corresponding forged proof that was output by SZK
starts with a1, or else A has queried some x
′ such that
H(i− 2, . . . , H(1, H(0, x′, a′1), a
′
2), . . . a
′
i−1)
= H(i− 2, . . . , H(1, H(0, x, a1), a2), . . . , ai−1)
and ai = a
′
i, where (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
i) is part of the SZK proof resulting from the query x
′. By the fact
that H is a random oracle, it is infeasible for A to find such an x′.
In the context of weak simulation-sound extractability, the fact thatA has queried x is enough to
derive a contradiction. For the strong variant, we now have that SZK has output (x, a1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
n,
z′) such that
V(x, a1, Hf (0, x, a1), a
′
2, c
′
2 . . . , a
′
n, c
′
n, z
′) = 1
and A has output (x, a1, a2, . . . , an, z) such that
V(x, a1, Hf (0, x, a1), a2, c2, . . . , an, cn, z) = 1
(and A knows both since it interacted with SZK). By the computationally unique responses prop-
erty of Π, it must be that a2 = a
′
2. But then it follows that
c2 = Hf (1, Hf (0, x, a1), a2) = Hf (1, Hf(0, x, a1), a
′
2) = c
′
2
(remember that both proofs are accepting with respect to Hf ) which in turn implies that a3 = a
′
3,
etc. Thus, we obtain that A has output a proof that was produced by SZK , yielding a contradiction.
We conclude that
V
Hf
FS (x, a1, . . . , an, z) = 1 implies V
H
FS(x, a1, . . . , an, z) = 1
except with negligible probability.
In the rest of the proof of Theorems 24 and 25 in [Unr17], no properties specific to a three-
round scheme are used, and so the results extend to the PCIP context, that is, FS[Π∗] is (strongly)
simulation-sound extractable. Now applying Theorem 31 from [Unr17], we obtain that Sig[Π] is
(s)UF-CMA. ⊓⊔
13 This property is required to have sufficient entropy on the inputs to the oracle that are reprogrammed
by the zero-knowledge simulator SZK . While SZK may reprogram the oracle on inputs (i− 1, ci−1, ai)
for i > 1, it is enough to require the first message a1 to have sufficient entropy, since with ci−1, these
later inputs all include a uniformly random element from the superpolynomially large challenge space.
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Together with the fact that commit-and-open PCIPs can easily be made quantum extractable
in the right sense by using standard hash-based commitments based on a collapsing hash function,
we obtain the security of the MQDSS signature scheme. Recall that the standard hash-based
commitment scheme works as follows. On input s, the commitment algorithm samples a random
opening string u and outputs it together with the commitment c = H(s, u). Opening just works
by recomputing the hash and comparing it with c . Note that, while this commitment scheme is
collapse-binding [Unr16], we need the stronger property of collapsingness of the function defined by
the commitment algorithm that, on input a string and some randomness, outputs a commitment
(collapse-binding only requires the collapsingness with respect to the committed string, not the
opening information).
Corollary 24 (sUF-CMA of MQDSS) Let ΠSSH be the 5-round identification scheme from
[SSH11] repeated in parallel a suitable number of times and instantiated with the standard hash-
based commitment scheme using a collapsing hash function. Then the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme
constructed from ΠSSH is sUF-CMA.
Proof (sketch). In ΠSSH, the honest prover’s first message consists of two commitments, and the
second and final messages contain functions of the strings committed to in the first message. This
structure, together with the computational binding property (implied by the collapse binding prop-
erty) of the commitments, immediately implies that ΠSSH has computationally unique responses.
According to Corollary 30 in the appendix, ΠSSH is a quantum proof of knowledge. It also has
HVZK according to [SSH11]. Finally, the first message of ΠSSH is clearly unpredictable. An appli-
cation of Theorem 23 finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
7.2 Sequential Or Proofs
A second application of our multi-input version of the measure-and-reprogram result is to the OR-
proof as introduced by Liu, Wei and Wong [LWW04] and further analyzed by Fischlin, Harasser
and Janson [?]. This is an alternative (non-interactive) proof for proving existence/knowledge of
(at least) one of two witnesses without revealing which one, compared to the well known technique
by Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers [CDS94].
Formally, given two Σ-protocols Σ0, and Σ1, for languages L0, and L1, respectively, [LWW04]
proposes as a non-interactive proof for the OR-language L∨ = {(x0, x1) : x0 ∈ L0 ∨ x1 ∈ L1} a
quadruple π∨ = (a0, a1, z0, z1) such that
V H∨ (x0, x1, π∨) :=
[
V0
(
x0, a0, H(1, x0, x1, a1), z0
)
∧ V1
(
x1, a1, H(0, x0, x1, a0), z1
)]
is satisfied. Fischlin et al. call this construction sequential OR proof. We emphasize that the two
challenges c0 and c1 are computed “over cross”, i.e., the challence c0 for the execution of Σ0 is
computed by hashing a1, and vice versa. It is straightforward to verify that if Σ0 and Σ1 are
special honest-verifier zero-knowledge, meaning that for any challenge c and response z one can
efficiently compute a first message a such that (a, c, z) is accepted, then it is sufficient to be
able to succeed in one of the two interactive protocols Σ0 and Σ1 in order to honestly produce
such an OR-proof π∨. Thus, depending on the context, it is sufficient that one instance is in the
corresponding language, or that the prover knows one of the two witnesses, to produce π∨. Indeed,
if, say, x0 ∈ L0 (and a witness w0 is available), then π∨ can be produced as follows. Prepare a0
according to Σ0, compute c1 := H(0, x0, x1, a0) and simulate z1 and a1 using the special honest-
verifier zero-knowledge property of Σ1 so that V1(x1, a1, c1, z1) is satisfied, and then compute the
response z0 for the challenge c0 := H(1, x0, x1, a1) according to Σ0.
On the other hand, intuitively one expects that one of the two instances must be true in order
to be able to successfully produce a proof. Indeed, [LWW04] shows security of the sequential OR
in the (classical) ROM. [?] go a step further and show security in the (classical) non-programmable
ROM. Here we show that our multi-input version of the measure-and-reprogram result (as a matter
of fact the 2-input version) implies security in the QROM.
Theorem 25 There exists a black-box quantum polynomial-time interactive algorithm Pˆ, which
first outputs a bit b and two instances x0, x1, and in a second stage acts as an interactive prover
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that runs Σb on instance xb, such that for any adversary A making q queries to a uniformly random
function H and for any x◦0, x
◦
1:
Pr
[
x0 = x
◦
0 ∧ x1 = x
◦
1 ∧ vb = accept : (b, x0, x1, vb)← 〈Pˆ
A,Vb〉
]
≥
1
(2q + 1)4
Pr
H
[
x0 = x
◦
0 ∧ x1 = x
◦
1 ∧ V
H
∨ (x0, x1, π∨) : (x0, x1, π∨)← A
H
]
.
As explained above, the execution (b, x0, x1, vb)← 〈Pˆ
A,Vb〉 should be understood in that Pˆ
A first
outputs x0, x1 and b, and then it engages with Vb to execute Σb on instance xb. Thus, the statement
ensures that if AH succeeds to produce a convincing proof π∨ then Pˆ
A succeeds to convincingly
run Σ0 or Σ1 (with similar success probability), where it is up to Pˆ
A to choose which one it wants
to do.
Of course, the statement translates to the static setting where the two instances x0 and x1 are
fixed and not produced by the dishonest prover.
Proof. The algorithm A fits well into the statement of Theorem 6 with the two extractable inputs
x˜0 = (0, x0, x1, a0) and x˜1 = (1, x0, x1, a1). Thus, we can consider the 3-stage algorithm S ensured
by Theorem 6, which behaves as follows with at least the probability given by the right hand
side of the claimed inequality. In the first stage, it outputs a permutation on the set {0, 1}, which
we represent by a bit b ∈ {0, 1} with b = 0 corresponding to the identity permutation, as well
as x˜b = (b, x0, x1, ab). On input a random Θb = c1−b (“locally” chosen by Pˆ), S then outputs
x˜1−b = (1− b, x0, x1, a1−b). Finally, on input a random Θ1−b = cb (provided by Vb as the challenge
upon the first message ab), S outputs z0, z1 so that V∨ is satisfied with the challenges cb and
c1−b, and thus in particular Vb
(
xb, ab, cb, zb
)
is satisfied. This directly shows the existence of Pˆ as
claimed.
⊓⊔
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A Quantum extractability of q2 identification schemes
A class of identification schemes that is of particular interest are so-called q2-identification schemes.
The NIST candidate signature scheme MQDSS, for example, is obtained from such an identification
scheme via the multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation from Definition 20 (with some additional
strings included in the hash arguments). In this section, we will prove that a PCIP with a so-called
“q2 extractor” [CHR+16, Definition 4.6] is a quantum proof of knowledge if it has an additional
collapsingness property. This is necessary for its Fiat-Shamir transformation to fulfill (s)UF-CMA
in the QROM (for (s)UF-CMA in the ROM, the q2-extractor alone is sufficient [CHR+16]).
We begin by defining q2 identification schemes and their extractors.
Definition 26 A 5-round identification scheme is a q2 identification scheme, if the second chal-
lenge is a single bit. A q2 identification scheme is called q2-extractable if there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm that, on input four transcripts t(i) = (a
(i)
1 , c
(i)
1 , a
(i)
2 , c
(i)
2 , z
(i)), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, such
that
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2 = c
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2 ,
(13)
outputs the secret key with non-negligible probability.
For ease of exposition we have assumed that the different challenges of a single PCIP come all from
the same challenge space. A q2 identification scheme can be brought into this form by having the
prover compute the second challenge by selecting the first bit of an augmented second challenge
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that is as large as the first one. For classical provers, four transcripts as required by the above
definition can be obtained by straightforward rewinding. In the following, we show that, if the q2
identification scheme has an additional property similar to the quantum-computationally unique
responses property introduced in [DFMS19, LZ19], then the existence of a q2 extractor implies
that there exists a quantum extractor. This makes the scheme a quantum proof of knowledge.
The argument follows the same lines as the one given in [DFMS19] to prove that t-soundness
and quantum-computationally unique responses imply the quantum proof-of-knowledge-property,
which in turn is an extension of the result by Unruh for Σ-protocols with perfect unique responses
[Unr12].
Recall the definition of a collapsing relation, [DFMS19, Definition 23], a generalization of the
notion of a collapsing hash function [Unr16]. We define the notion of collapsingness for interactive
proof systems as follows:
Definition 27 A (2n+1)-round interactive proof system Π is called collapsing, if the relation
RΠ : X × Y → {0, 1} with X = C
n × A1 and Y = A2 × ... × An × Z given by the verification
predicate VΠ of Π is collapsing from X to Y.
Note that for n = 1, this notion of collapsingness coincides with the notion of quantum-computa-
tionally unique responses from [DFMS19].
Given a q2-identification scheme Π, consider the following straightforward (first stage of a)
quantum extractor EA
Π
. The extractor runs the prover A using honestly sampled challenges to
obtain a first transcript t(1). Now it rewinds three times and reruns A, each time with a fresh
pair of challenges, chosen such as to obtain t(i), i = 2, 3, 4 such that the four transcripts fulfill the
conditions (13). For this extractor, we obtain the following
Theorem 28 Let Π a q2-extractable q2-identification scheme that is also collapsing. Then the
success probability of the extractor EA
Π
is lower-bounded in terms of the success probability of the
prover A as
Pr[EAΠ extracts] ≥
(
Pr
[
v = accept : (x, v)← 〈A,VΠ〉
])7
(14)
The proof of this theorem is essentially the same as for Theorem 25 in [DFMS19], which is a
slight modification of an argument from [Unr12].
As a corollary, we obtain the fact that for q2 identification schemes, q2-extractability and
collapsingness imply the quantum proof of knowledge property as defined in [Unr12].
Corollary 29 Let Π a q2-extractable q2-identification scheme that is also collapsing. Then it is a
quantum proof of knowledge.
In particular, the 5-round identification scheme ΠSSH from [SSH11] which is used to construct
the post-quantum digital signature scheme MQDSS has these properties under plausible assump-
tions, namely that it is instantiated with the standard hash-based commitment scheme using a
collapsing hash function [Unr16] (see discussion towards the end of Section 7.1). For MQDSS, this
is no additional assumption, as the Fiat-Shamir transformation uses the QROM anyway, and a
quantum accessible random oracle is collapsing by [Unr16].
Corollary 30 If the 5-round identification scheme from [SSH11] is instantiated with the stan-
dard hash-based commitment scheme using a collapsing hash function, it is a quantum proof of
knowledge.
Proof (sketch). According to [CHR+16], ΠSSH is a q2-extractable q2 identification scheme. In ΠSSH,
the honest prover’s first message consists of two commitments, and the second and final messages
contain functions of the strings commited to in the first message, and some opening information,
respectively. Measuring a function of a register is equivalent to a partial computational basis
measurement of that register. According to the the collapsing property of the hash function, no
efficient algorithm can distinguish whether the the committed string and the opening information
are measured or not. This clearly implies the same indistinguishability for partial measurements
of the string register, which implies that ΠSSH is collapsing. ⊓⊔
Note that the above proof works for any multi-round PCIP that has a similar commit-and-open
structure.
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